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We propose a model that accounts for how people construct prototypes for com- 
posite concepts out of prototypes for simple concepts. The first component of the 
model is a prototype representation for simple, noun concepts, such as fruit, 
which specifies: (1) the relevant attributes of the concepts, (2) the possiblevalues 
of each attribute, (3) the salience of each value, and (4) the diognosticity of each 
attribute. The second component of the model specifies procedures for modifying 
simple prototypes so that they represent new, composite concepts. The procedure 
for adjectival modification, OS when red modifies fruft, consists of selecting the 
relevant attribute(s) in the noun concept (color), boosting the diognosticity of that 
ottribute, and increosing‘the salience of the value named by the adfective (red). 
The procedure for odverbiol modification, OS in very red frutt, consists of multipli- 
cation-by-a-scalar of the salience of the relevant volue (red). The outcome of 
these procedures is a new prototype representation. The third component of the 
model is Tversky’s (1977) contrast rule for determining the similority between a 
representation for a prototype and one for on instance. The model is shown to be 
consistent with previous findings about prototypes in generol, OS well as with 
specific findings about typicality judgments for adjective-noun conjunctions. Four 
new experiments provide further detailed support for the model. 
Research on natural concepts, such as apple and fish, has led to the conclu- 
sion that part of the mental representation of a concept consists of a “proto- 
type,” rbughly, a description of the best examples or central tendency of 
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a concept. Specifically, research has shown that the instances of any concept 
vary in how typical they are rated, and that such ratings predict how quickly 
and accurately an instance can be categorized, how readily it can be retrieved 
from memory, how early it can be learned, how efficiently it can be coded 
linguistically, and so on (see e.g., Mervis & Rosch, 1981). In light of such 
findings, it seems reasonable to posit that experience, direct or indirect, 
with exemplars of a concept gives rise to a prototype for that concept, that 
the rated typicality of an instance is a good predictor of its similarity to its 
prototype, and that similarity-to-prototype plays some role in categoriza- 
tion, memory and communication (see, e.g., Smith & Medin, 1981). 
Such is the account commonly advanced within the prototype tradition 
for “simple” concepts, that is, concepts denoted by single words. But what 
about “composite” concepts, such as striped apple and literary politician 
(i.e., concepts formed from simpler constituents)?’ For many such con- 
cepts, their instances seem to vary in typicality; yet we cannot have induced 
a prototype for each composite concept on the basis of experience with its 
exemplars, because many composite concepts are novel combinations and 
hence unfamiliar. There must therefore be some means of computing the 
typicality of an instance in a composite concept from knowledge about its 
constituents, some way of determining, say, that Lassie is not a very good 
example of ferocious animal, given what we know about Lassie and the con- 
cepts ferocious and animal. 
More generally, if prototype theory is to be extended to composite con- 
cepts, principles of conceptual composition must be supplied. This is the 
concern of the present paper. In particular, we will focus on adjective-noun 
conjunctions such as striped apple and not very red fruit, and specify how 
prototypes for such conjunctions can be composed from prototypes for 
their constituents. While the specifics of our claims apply to only adjective- 
noun compounds, some of the broader principles we espouse may also char- 
acterize noun-noun compounds such as dog house.’ 
Our exposition is arranged as follows: First, we motivate and present a 
model of how adjectives modify noun prototypes to form prototypes for 
conjunctions. Second, we describe in detail an initial experimental test of 
this model. Third, we present two subsequent tests of assumptions of the 
model. Fourth, we extend the model to handle conjunctions involving ad- 
verbs. Fifth, we provide an experimental test of the extended model. Sixth 
and finally, we take up a number of outstanding issues. 
I We use italics to indicate concepts, and reserve quotes for the words that denote these con- 
cepts. 
2 Fodor (1981) has argued that some composite concepts do not have prototypes, and hence 
there must be more to concepts than prototypes. This argument in no way conflicts with the 
present analyses. We are concerned only with those composite concepts that do have proto- 
types, and we have argued elsewhere that such prototypes do not exhaust the contents of a con- 
cept (see, e.g., Osherson & Smith, 1981). 
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A MODEL FOR ADJECTIVE-NOUN CONJUNCTIONS 
Rationale for the Model 
General Aspects of Prototypes. The term “prototype” has sometimes 
been used to mean a representation of the best example for a given concept 
(e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Mervis & Rosch, 1981). In this sense, a pro- 
totype for apple might be an image or a mental description of an especially 
good apple instance. Our own theory generalizes this idea to allow a proto- 
type to be a more abstract description of the concept. In our view, a proto- 
type is a prestored representation of the usual properties associated with the 
concept’s instances (much as in schema or frame theory-see, e.g., Minsky, 
1975; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). Thus, an apple prototype will include 
properties such as having seeds, properties that are part of our common- 
sense knowledge about apples. Earlier work on prototypes indicated that a 
concept’s prototype includes properties that are not strictly necessary for 
concept membership (e.g., Rosch, 1973; Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974). The 
prototype of apple, for example, includes the nonnecessary properties of 
red, round, and smooth. Subsequent work has shown that the contents of a 
prototype must include far more than a list of properties. 
For one thing, we need to decompose the notion of a property into two 
components: attribute and value. Thus the apple prototype includes attri- 
bute-value pairs such as color-red, shape-round, and texture-smooth. The 
reason for including attributes in prototypes is simply that there are numer- 
ous cases where people use attribute knowledge in categorization. Consider 
categorization with negative concepts, such as nonred fruit. Without the 
notion of an attribute, how can one ever know that a blueberry is an in- 
stance of nonred fruit? To know that blue counts as nonred while round 
does not, one must know that a certain set of values (the colors) constitutes 
an attribute. 
A prototype also includes some indication of the salience of each relevant 
value. A couple of lines of evidence point to this conclusion. For one thing, 
when asked to verify that a property is true of a particular concept, people 
respond faster to properties that have previously been rated as more related 
or associated to the concept than to those rated less related (e.g., Glass 8c 
Holyoak, 1975). Thus, people are faster at deciding that apples are red than 
apples are round, suggesting that red is more salient than round in the pro- 
totype for apple. Another line of evidence for salience is that the nature of a 
value seems to be relative to a concept, the red in apple, for example, being 
redder than that in brick but less than that in a fire engine (Halff, Ortony, 8c 
Anderson, 1976). This suggests that the red in apple is more salient than 
that in brick, though less salient than the red in fire engine. 
Finally, a prototype may also include some indication of the diagnosticity 
of each attribute, that is, a measure of how useful the attribute is in discrim- 
inating instances of the concept from instances of contrasting concepts. The 
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importance of diagnosticity was demonstrated by Rosch and Mervis (1975); 
when subjects have to decide whether or not an item belongs to a target con- 
cept, they consider not only the item’s attribute-by-attribute similarity to 
the target concept but also its attribute;by-attribute dissimilarity to concepts 
that contrast with the target. 1 
In short, any model of prototype composition would do well to start with 
prototypes that include: (1) an attribute-value structure, (2) indications of 
value salience, and (3) indications of attribute diagnosticity. 
Conjuncfioon Effects. In addition to the above three general aspects, the 
development of our model was guided by three specific findings that involve 
typicality judgments for adjective-noun combinations. The most important 
of these findings we call the “conjunction effect.” To illustrate the effect, 
consider the typicality of a particular red apple as an instance of the con- 
cepts apple and red apple. Several experiments have found that the rated 
typicality of the instance in the conjunction exceeds that in the simple con- 
cept. Our red apple is judged more typical of red apple than of apple (Hamp- 
ton, 1982; Osherson &Smith, 1982; Smith & Osherson, 1984; Shafir, Smith, 
& Osherson, 1988; for a related effect, see Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).’ 
Smith and Osherson (1984) uncovered a second phenomenon of interest. 
They investigated “incompatible” conjunctions, such as brow!? apple, where 
the adjective denotes an unlikely value of the object denoted by the noun, 
and “compatible” conjunctions, such as red apple, where the adjective de- 
notes a likely value of the object denoted by the noun. They found that the 
conjunction effect is greater for incompatible than compatible conjunctions. 
For example, the extent to which a brown apple is judged more typical of 
brown apple than of apple is greater than the extent to which a red apple is 
judged more typical of red apple than of apple. A third finding arises when 
the item to be categorized is not a true member of the conjunction (e.g., a 
brown apple paired with the conjunction red apple). Unsurprisingly, here 
there is a “reverse conjunction” effect, the item being judged less typical of 
the conjunction than of the noun constituent (Smith & Osherson, 1984). 
The Selective Modification Model 
The model that we propose is an extension of one discussed in Smith and 
Osherson (1984). The current model has three major components: (1) a pro- 
totype representation for simple noun concepts, (2) procedures for modify- 
ing such a prototype, and (3) a means for determining the typicality of an 
a We follow Tversky and Kahncman (1983) in calling adjective-noun phrases “conjunc- 
tions.” However, we do not mean to imply that phrases such as “red apple” are quivalent in 
meaning to explicit conjunctions such as “both red and apple.” Indeed, in “red apple,” the ad- 
jective seems to modify the noun concept rather than combine with it conjunctivcly (Odcn, 
1984). an intuition that lies at the heart of the model we develop. 
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instance vis-a4 a prototype. We begin by describing the ftrst and third 
components. The descriptions in this section are illustrative, more precision 
being supplied in the next section. 
T)picaIit.v and Simple Concepts. A prototype for the concept apple is il- 
lustrated in the left-most panel of Figure 1, and it includes the three general 
aspects discussed earlier. The representation specifies: (1) A set of relevant 
attributes (color, shape, texture, etc.), and for each attribute a set of possi- 
ble values that instances of the concept can assume (e.g., for color, the 
values include red, green, and brown); (2) The diagnosticity of each attri- 
bute for the concept, as indicated by the number to the attribute’s left, and 
(3) The salience of each value of an attribute, as indicated by the number to 
the value’s right (we refer to these numbers as “votes” for the value). With 
regard to a value’s salience, we suspect that it reflects at least two contribut- 
ing factors: the subjective frequency with which the value occurs in instances 
of the concepts, and the perceptibility of the value. Thus, red apples are 
encountered more frequently than green ones, and that may be why the red 
in apple is more salient (has more votes) than the green in apple. Also, the 
red of an apple is more perceptible than the red of a brick, and that may be 
why the red in apple is more salient (has more votes) than the red in brick. 
The remaining panels of Figure 1 illustrate representations for two spe- 
cific objects (or “instances”), I, and I,, a typical red apple and a brown 
apple. We assume that an object representation is like a prototype except 
that it does not contain any indication of an attribute’s diagnosticity. (We 
let the prototype alone determine attribute diagnosticity because it is being 
used as a standard against which the object is compared.) For simplicity, we 
have assumed further that for I, and 1, all votes for an attribute are on one 
value (but this need not be generally true of object representations). 
To determine an instance’s typicality in a concept, we assume that typi- 
cality rests on similarity. To measure similarity, we use Tversky’s (1977) 
“contrast” rule, which assesses similarity by a contrast between common 
and distinctive features. In our application of this model, each vote counts 
as a feature. In essence, n votes on a value (say, red) is equivalent to there 
being n copies of that value (n reds). The similarity between the features of a 
prototype (“P”) and the features of an instance (“I”) is given by: 
Sim(P,I) = fl(Pfl I) - bf(p-I) -d(I-P), (1) 
where P fl I designates the set of votes or features common to the prototype 
and instance, P-I designates the set of features distinct to the prototype, 
and I-P designates the set of features distinct to the instance. In addition,f 
is a function that measures the importance of each of these three set of fea- 
tures, and a, b, and c are parameters that determine the relative contributions 






















































































































































































































































































































































































COMBINING PROTOTYPES 491 
of the features common to the prototype and instance, and a decreasing 
function of the features distinct to the prototype and of those distinct to the 
instance. 
For purposes of making computations, it is convenient to use a version 
of Equation (1) that specifies the common and distinctive features on an 
attribute-by-attribute basis. This is given by: 
Sim(P,I) = Ci[afi (P tl I) - bji (P-I) - cfi (I-P)], (2) 
where i indexes the relevant attributes, and now P fl I designates the set of 
features or votes on attribute i common to the prototype and instance, P-I 
designates the set of features of attribute i distinct to the prototype, and I-P 
designates the set of features of attribute i distinct to the instance. Beneath 
each object representation in Figure 1, we have used Equation (2) to calcu- 
late the object’s similarity to the apple prototype. We have assumed that a, 
b, and c are equal to one (just to keep things simple for now). We have fur- 
ther assumed that J multiplies the number of votes for attribute i in a set by 
the diagnosticity of i. To illustrate, to determine the similarity between the 
typical red apple (designated “I,“) and the prototype for apple (designated 
“A”) on the color attribute, we note that apple and the red apple share 25 
red votes, that apple has 5 distinct green votes, that the red apple has 5 dis- 
tinct red votes, and that each component of the contrast is multiplied by the 
diagnosticity of 1.0 (see Figure 1). The computations are similar for the 
other attributes. For the examples provided in Figure 1, the contrast rule 
correctly predicts that the red apple, I,, should be judged to be more typical 
of apple than is the brown apple, I*. 
Note that the only representational difference between I, and I2 is on the 
color attribute. This difference eventuates in a large typicality difference 
between I, and I1 because color has a substantial number of features (votes) 
and is a very diagnostic attribute. To appreciate the importance of diagnos- 
ticity, consider a third possible instance, I,, which is identical to I, except 
that all its texture votes are on bumpy. The typicality of I, in apple is: 
Sim(A,I,) = l(25 - 5 - 5) + .5(15 -5 -5) + .25(0- 30- 30) 
=15+2.5-15 
=2.5 
Hence, I, is more typical of apple than is 12, solely because 1,‘s mismatching 
attribute (texture) is less diagnostic than that of I2 (color). This version of 
the contrast rule thus nicely captures differences in diagnosticity as well as 
differences in features or salience. 
Adjective Modification. To extend this account to adjective-noun con- 
junctions, we need to specify how the adjective interacts with the noun. 
Two general ideas about the nature of this interaction have been proposed 
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(see Cohen & Murphy, 1984, for discussion). One possibility is that the ad- 
jective and noun play symmetrical roles and that in forming a conjunction 
the features of the two concepts are somehow intersected. The other possi- 
bility is that the adjective and noun concepts play different and asymmetri- 
cal roles, the noun being the basic frame to be operated on and the adjective 
being the operator or modifier. We opt for the latter, “modification” ap- 
proach. One reason for doing so is that there can be a striking change in 
meaning when the order of an adjective-noun combination is reversed- 
consider red apple versus apple red-and it is not obvious why this sort of 
change should occur if the conjunction is some kind of symmetrical inter- 
section of the two prototypes. Other reasons for favoring a modification 
approach over an intersection one are discussed by Cohen and Murphy 
(1984)’ 
Our basic proposal about the modification process is as follows: Each 
attribute in the adjective concept selects the corresponding attribute in the 
noun concept; then, for each selected attribute in the noun, there is an in- 
crease in the salience (or votes) of the value given in the adjective, as well as 
an increase in the diagnosticity of the attribute. Consider shriveled apple as 
an example. Presumably shriveled contains attributes pertaining to shape 
and texture; accordingly, it would select these attributes in the apple proto- 
type, boost their diagnosticities, and shift their votes away from round and 
smooth and toward irregular and bumpy. 
In developing a precise account of the model, however, we will consider 
only those adjectives that presumably contain a single attribute, for example, 
red or brown. Figure 2 illustrates our specific assumptions for such cases. 
The adjective: (1) selects the relevant attribute in the noun (e.g., color), (2) 
shifts all votes on that attribute into the value named by the adjective, and 
(3) boosts the diagnosticity associated with the attribute. In the example at 
the top of Figure 2, most of the color votes already were on the value speci- 
fied by the adjective, so few votes have to be shifted; this is the hallmark of 
compatible conjunctions. In the example at the bottom of Figure 2, all color 
votes have to be shifted, which is the hallmark of incompatible conjunc- 
tiODS.’ 
The above proposals hinge on two distinct intuitions about modification: 
roughly, that color is more important for determining typicality in red apple 
’ Another approach to modification is possible if one adopts the view that a prototype con- 
sists of the best examples of a concept. Modification might amount to a change in the exam- 
pks; for example, in the prototype for apple two of the three best examples might be red, while 
in the prototype for red apple all three best examples might be red. A serious problem with this 
approach is that it offers no principled account of how the best examples are chosen. 
’ Instead of shifting all votes to the value specified by the adjective, the votes might be 
distributed so that the more similar a value to that specifted by the adjective the more votes that 
value receives. For example, in composing brown apple most votes may shift to brown, but 
some may remain on red because that value is similar to brown. While this seems plausible, for 
purposes of simplicity we ignore this possibility in what follows. 
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Ffgure 2. lllustrotion of three ospeds of adjective modification. 
than in apple (the diagnosticity boost), and that a typical red apple is redder 
than a typical apple (the salience change). The rationale for the salience 
change is obvious: The change from apple to red apple unequivocaLly sig- 
nals a change in the color of typical instances. The rationale for the boost in 
diagnosticity is more subtle. The boost is likely mediated by a change in the 
perceived contrast class of the concept. As we change from apple to red 
apple, the contrast class may change from oranges to green apple; if so, then 
color is the only distinguishing attribute for the conjunction, and that is 
why its diagnosticity increases. 
Figure 3 illustrates the implications of the above changes in salience and 
diagnosticity for typicality ratings with compatible conjunctions. The left- 
most panel of the figure contains the prototype for red apple. The only dif- 
ferences between this representation and that of apple involve the color 
attribute. Now, all votes are on red, and the diagnosticity of color has in- 
creased by a factor of two (two being an arbitrary choice on our part). The 
effects of these differences for typicality are illustrated in the remaining 
panels of Figure 3. There we have repeated the representations for our red 
and brown apples, and computed the similarity for each of these objects in 
the conjunction. When these similarity scores are compared with those in 
Figure 1, the results are that (1) The red apple is more similar to red apple 
than it is to apple, while (2) the brown apple is less similar to red apple than 








































































































































































































































































































































































COMBINING PROTOTYPES 495 
Figure 4 illustrates a comparable analysis for incompatible conjunctions. 
The prototype for brown apple differs from that of apple only in that now 
all color votes are on brown and color has doubled in diagnosticity. The 
effect of these changes for typicality are shown in the remaining panels. 
Now, in comparison with our original computations in Figure 1, we find 
that the brown apple is more similar to brown apple than it is to apple, while 
the red apple is less similar to brown apple than it is to apple. Again we have 
reconstructed the conjunction effect and its reverse. Note further than the 
conjunction effect predicted in this case exceeds that in the previous case, 
which reconstructs the third effect described earlier. That is, the extent to 
which the brown apple is judged more typical of brown apple than apple 
(66 - (- 54) = 120) is greater than the extent to which the red apple is judged 
more typical of red apple than apple (66-21=45). 
Further Implications. The selective modification model incorporates the 
three general aspects of prototypes discussed earlier, and accounts in detail 
for the three conjunction effects. The model also has two additional impli- 
cations that deserve to be spelled out. 
One implication concerns a subtle prediction about conjunction effects. 
The typicality of, say, a brown apple in brown apple should be roughly 
equal to that of a red apple in red apple. That is, with regard to determining 
typicality in a conjunction, what matters is the attribute not the value. This 
prediction follows because the total number of brown votes in brown apple 
or red votes in red apple is simply the total number of color votes that apple 
has. The data reported in Smith and Osherson (1984) support the prediction. 
The second implication of the model is our assumption that during modi- 
fication a simple adjective, such as red oryong, selectively influences a single 
attribute of the noun representation. All things considered, this “selective 
influence” assumption may be too strong. There are relations between attri- 
butes, and some of these relations may be part of a prototype (see, e.g., 
Malt & Smith, 1984). Among apples, for example, there are relations be- 
tween color, shape, and sweetness-compared with a red apple, a brownish 
one is usually more shriveled and less sweet. Hence, brown applied to apple 
may change more than just the color attribute. Medin and Shoben (1988) 
have recently reported findings that appear to demonstrate such additional 
changes.6 
( Medin and Shoben (1988) showed, for example, that a small spoon is judged more typical 
than a large spoon of spoon, while the reverse obtains for wooden spoon. This suggests that the 
adjective wooden has affected the size attribute. This argument seems plausible, but an alterna- 
tive account should also be kept in mind. One’s knowledge about the size of wooden spoons 
may have little to do with composition processes, but instead reflects prior experience with 
known instances of wooden spoon. That is, wooden spoon is not an unfamiliar concept, hence 
experience with its instances may figure in typicality judgments (Hampton, 1987). This con- 
sideration indicates that research on conceptual composition has not paid sufficient attention 
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These additional changes, though, may not be as profound as the primary 
change (e.g., in brown apple, only a few of the shape or taste votes may be 
shifted, and there may be only small increases in the diagnosticities of these 
attributes). Also, the additional changes may be made subsequent to the 
primary one so that the additional changes are in effect part of another pro- 
cess. That is, initial judgments about membership in conjunctive concepts 
may conform with our selective-influence assumption. This possibility is 
supported by the evidence that we present in subsequent sections where we 
demonstrate how well our model predicts typicality ratings for conjunctions. 
The issue of selective modification is sufficiently controversial, though, that 
we return to it at the end of the paper. 
A FIRST TEST OF THE MODEL: STUDY 1 
The preceding account was highly illustrative. We used but a single noun 
concept, had no basis for the attributes, values, or votes that were included 
in the noun’s prototype, and no rationale for the diagnosticity weights nor 
for how much they were boosted by modification. Study 1 remedied these 
deficiencies. In part 1, subjects listed properties of various instances of the 
concepts fruit and vegetable; these listings were used to determine the attri- 
butes, values, votes, and diagnosticities for the instances and concepts. 
With such representations in hand, we could use our modification proce- 
dures to produce representations for conjunctions, and then employ the 
contrast rule to predict the typicalities of the instances in the simple con- 
cepts and conjunctions. These predicted typicalities were compared with 
actual ratings obtained in part 2 of the study. 
Part 1 
Method. The instances used were basic-level concepts, such as apple, 
peach, carrot, and onion, rather than specific objects like those employed 
by Smith and Osherson (1984) and used to illustrate the model in the previ- 
ous section. This change in level allowed us to dispense with pictures or 
models of instances, in favor of one-word descriptions. 
Thirty subjects listed properties forfruit instances and 30 listed properties 
for vegetable instances. All subjects were Harvard-Radcliffe undergraduates 
who were paid for their participation. Each subject was given a booklet that 
consisted of a page of instructions followed by 15 test pages, each of the 
latter containing the name of one fruit or one vegetable instance. The in- 
structions were essentially the same as those used by Rosch and Mervis 
(1975). They informed subjects that, for each instance, they were to write 
down all its properties they could think of, and that they had 90 seconds to 
do this. The order of instances was randomly determined for each subject. 
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Resulrs. First, any property that was mentioned by only one subject was 
eliminated. Then, for each instance, two raters (two of the authors) inspected 
the resulting set of listed properties for ones that intuitively seemed to be 
values of the same attribute. Wherever there was any disagreement between 
the raters, the properties were dropped from consideration. Only 12% of 
the iisted properties was eliminated by these criteria. 
For each attribute selected, the number of mentions of each property, or 
value, was taken as a measure of its number of votes. Part of this coding for 
the instance carrof is presented in Figure 5. While the figure shows only 4 
attributes, there were in fact a total of 15 attributes for carrof. Most impor- 
tantly, the attributes that emerged for this instance also appeared with other 
vegetable andfiuif instances, as only 26 different attributes emerged across 
all 30 instances. This communality makes it reasonable to determine the attri- 
bute-value representation for the concepts fruit and vegetable by averaging 
over all relevant instances on each attribute, as illustrated on the right-hand 
side of Figure 5. Such averaging is in keeping with the idea of a prototype as 
a measure of central tendency. Our prototype for fruit, then, consisted of 
25 attributes with an average of 7.16 values per attribute, while our proto- 
type for vegetable contained 25 attributes with an average of 7.28 values per 
attribute. All of these attributes are listed in Table 1, along with the total 
number of votes cast for each, separately for fmif and vegetable. (Other 
ways of determining attribute-value representation for fruit and Kegefable 
are discussed in connection with Experiment 4.) 
To estimate the diagnosticity weights for the concepts’ attributes, we 
assumed that the diagnosticity of an attribute would be largely a matter of 
how useful it was for discriminating between fruits and vegetables. Accord- 
ingly, for each attribute we formed an n by 2 table; the two columns desig- 
nated fmif and vegefable, the n rows designated every value of the attribute 
listed for any fruit or vegetable, and the cell entries were the numbers of 
votes for that value of fmif or vegetable. We then calculated the statistic v, a 
close cousin of chi-square (specifically, the square root of chi-square divided 
by the total number of votes in the table). This statistic varies between 0 and 
1 and indicates the extent to which the values of the attribute are associated 
with fmit but not vegetable, or vice versa. We took the value of v as an esti- 
mate of the attribute’s diagnosticity. These diagnosticity weights are given 
in the last column of Table 1.’ 
’ The general formula for v is: 
~=(Xz/Nmin(I-l).(I-l)~~R. 
where X2 is chi square. N is le total number of observations in the table. I is the number of 
rows, and I is the number of columns (Bishop, Feinbcrg, & Holland, 1975. Chap. 11). Because 
in our case there are always just two columns, the above formula reduces to: 
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TABLE 1 


































503 462 .44 
261 206 .61 
252 167 .69 
238 397 .84 
203 90 .82 
191 48 .13 
157 158 .70 
146 34 .61 
119 30 .37 
109 34 .12 
55 0 .43 
51 44 .52 
44 18 .55 
41 19 .96 
39 25 .50 
38 15 .24 
37 83 .71 
27 47 $95 
22 2 .34 
21 12 .53 
18 138 .83 
14 68 .67 
9 47 .90 
7 10 .79 
4 2 1.00 
a 36 .41 
We now have sufficient information to predict typicalities for each of the 
13 instances in the simple concepts fruit and vegetable, as well as in certain 
adjective-noun conjunctions. With regard to the simple concepts, earlier we 
pres’ented Equation (2), which, computes similarity on an attribute-by-attri- 
bute basis. However, the computing equation that we actually used iterates 
not only dter attributes, but over values of an attribute as well: 
Sim (PJ) = ljhJi~[a min(nii(P), nu(I)) 
- b(no(P) -?- nci(I)) - c(n(j(I) -no(P))]. (3 
Again i indexes the attributes, and now vi is the diagnosticity of attribute i. 
Also, j indexes the values on an attribute, and nu(*) is the number of votes 
on value j of attribute i. The expression in brackets denotes a contrast be- 
tween conimon and distinctive features for each value of each attribute, 
where the: dot over the minus sign indicates the difference must be positive 
(i.e., nu(P) + n&I) = nu(P) - n&) if no(P) > no(I), and 0 otherwise). To illus- 
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trate, suppose the prototype had 20 red votes and the instance 15 red votes. 
Then the number of common features would be 15 (the minimum of the 2 
vote counts), the number of features distinct to the prototype would be 5, 
the number distinct to the instance would be 0, these three numbers would 
be multiplied by a, 6, and c, respectively, and’the outcome of the contrast 
would be multiplled by the diagnosticity of color. 
To predict typitalities in conjunctions, we have to augment our computing 
equation in the following way: 
Sim (P,I)= piViF[C7 min(n;(P), no(I)) 
-~(nu+(P)‘~ii(I))-c(n(i(I)~nli*(P))l (4) 
Equation (4) differs from its predecessor in two respects. First, for the pro- 
totype, the number of votes on valuej of attribute i is now nu* (P), which is 
defined as follows: 
n;(P) = 
I 
fn&P), if the adjective in the conjunction matches valuej. 
4, if the adjective in the conjunction is a value of attribute iother 
than j. 
+(P), otherwise. 
For example, if the adjective in the conjunction is “red,” then the number 
of red votes in the prototype would be the sum of all color votes, the 
number of green votes in the prototype would be zero, and the number of 
votes on the value of any other attribute in the prototype would be as usual. 
The other novelty in Equation (4) is the addition of ei, which multiples vi, 
the diagnosticity of attribute i; ei is defined as follows: 
1 
d, if the adjective in the conjunction encodes i. 
ei= 
1, otherwise. 
Thus, the diagnosticity of an attribute is boosted by a factor of d (d>l) if 
that attribute is encoded by the adjective in the conjunction. Note that d, 
the “booster,” is the only free parameter in (4) apart from the contrast 
weights a, b, and c. Equations (3) and (4) were used to predict the typicalities 
of the relevant instances in the simple concepts fruit and vegetable and in 
he eight conjunctions described below. (To estimate parameters, we used 
he program STEPIT [Chandler, 19691, and maximized average correlations 
predicted and obtained ratings.) 
Part 2 
Method. Thirty subjects, drawn from the same population as in the pre- 
vious part of the study, rated the typicality of instances in 10 different con- 
cepts. These concepts included the simple concepts fruit and vegetable and 
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the conjunctions formed by combining them with red, white, round, and 
long. Every subject was given a booklet which included instructions and test 
pages; each of the latter contained the name of one of the 10 concepts 
followed by a list of 15 relevant instances. Subjects were instructed to rate 
each instance “. . .for how good an example it is of the category.” The 
ratings were made on an 1 l-point scale, where 10 means the instance “is 
about as good an example as you can get of your idea or image of what the 
category is and 0 means you think the item does not fit at all with your idea 
or image of the category.” 
The same 15 instances were used with fruit and with the 4 conjunctions 
involvingfruit; all of these were technically fruits though two-tomato and 
pickle-were sometimes classified as vegetables. There were also 15 instances 
that were used with vegetable and the 4 conjunctions involving vegetable; 13 
of them were technically vegetables while the remaining 2 were tomato and 
pickle. (All fruit and vegetable instances are listed in Table 2). For a given 
subject, the instances were listed in the same order when they appeared with 
different concepts (to ease the subject’s rating task), but the order of in- 
stances and concepts varied randomly across subjects. 
Results: Evaluation of the Model. For each of the 10 concepts, we deter- 
mined the average typicality ratings for the 15 instances. These ratings are 
presented in Table 2. Then, for each concept, we correlated the obtained 
ratings with those predicted by the model. These correlations are presented 
in the last row of Table 2. The model does a reasonable job with most of the 
concepts-the average r is about .70-and particularly with the vegetable 
concepts where the average r for the four conjunctions is .88.’ 
However, the model appears to fail with white fruit and long fruit. Fur- 
ther inspection of the obtained ratings for white fruit and long fruit, how- 
ever, suggests that the problem is not in the model but in our selection of 
instances. First, and most important, our fruit instances showed little varia- 
tion with respect to whiteness and length, which greatly limits the possible 
correlations. With regard to the obtained ratings for white fnrit and long 
fruit, 11 of the 15 instances were rated less than 2.0 on our 11-point scale 
(see Table 2). Another problem with the instances is specific to white fruit. 
The three instances that subjects rated most typical of whitefruit were coco- 
nut, apple, and pear; all three of these objects are white on the inside but 
not on the outside, yet it was outside color that subjects were instructed to 
* There may have been some contribution of an instance’s frequency to its predicted typi- 
cality (Nosofsky. personal communication. April, 1987). Because subjects tended to list fewer 
properties for very infrequent instances such as pomegrunote and ovocudo than for other in- 
stances, more properties of frequent than infrequent instances appeared in the prototypes of 
fruit and vegetuble. Consequently, infrequent instances may have ended up being deemed less 
similar to their prototype. 
TABLE 2 
Average Typicality Ratings for 10 Concepts 
IStudv 11 
Red White Round long 
















a.70 .5A 1.13 
0.44 2.27 SO 
a.44 33 .30 
7.64 1.10 1.84 
7.44 I.34 2.17 
7.37 .I7 9.04 
7.20 1.83 6.77 
6.87 .BA 2.80 
6.60 3.17 5.37 
6.40 2.80 7.53 
6.40 8.50 .30 
6.07 .A0 6.17 
3.93 60 1.37 
3.10 1.04 .93 













































9.77 9.34 A.23 
9.23 3.33 .93 
9.14 8.57 -74 
9.04 1.37 3.84 
8.40 3.60 3.23 
8.34 .A7 53 
7.27 5.44 .80 
6.94 6.07 .70 
6.70 .30 1.20 
A.73 1.07 .70 
A.64 .n .87 
4.10 .24 5.37 
3.37 AA SA 
3.33 6.37 .3A 
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rate and that our model considered in its predictions. The only other low 
correlation in Table 2 is for the simple concept vegetable. Again, the problem 
can be traced to a lack of variation in the instances: 12 of the 15 vegefable 
instances had typicality ratings between 6.07 and 8.70. The fruit instances 
showed substantially more variation. 
The parameter values obtained in fitting the model were estimated sepa- 
rately for fruit and vegetable concepts. Three of the four parameters were 
‘intrinsic to the contrast model: a, the weight given to common features; 6, 
the weight of features distinct to the concept; and c, the weight of features 
distinct to the instance. For vegefable concepts, II = .88, b = 30, and c = .20; 
for fruit concepts, u = 1.84, b = 30, and c = .20. The parameters are similar 
for the two kinds of concepts, and the ordering of the parameters is in agree- 
ment with prior results (Gati & Tversky, 1984; Tversky, 1977; Tversky & 
Gati, 1982). The fourth parameter, d, measures how much the diagnosticity 
of an attribute is boosted by modification. For vegetable concepts, d = 8.36, 
for fmit concepts, d=4.21. Clearly, the attribute encoded by the adjective 
plays a major role. 
Results: Conjunction Effects. Lastly, we want to examine the data for 
conjunction effects. Table 3 presents the relevant data and predictions for 
vegefable concepts; we ignore the data for frui? concepts in light of the prob- 
lems with fruit instances noted above. The top half of the table contains the 
data for instances that were “good” members of their corresponding con- 
junctions; for white vegetable, for example, just those instances that had at 
least five color votes on white. The bottom half of Table 3 contains the data 
for instances that were “poor” members of the conjunction; for white vege- 
table, those instances that had zero white votes. The data are presented 
separately for each conjunction. The obtained data replicate all our previ- 
TABLE 3 
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ous results: For good members, an instance is judged more typical of the 
conjunction than of the noun constituent; the conjunctions effect is greater 
for the incompatible conjunction (red vegetable) than for the compatible 
ones (the other three conjunctions); and for poor members, reversecon- 
junction effects occur as an instance is judged less typical of the conjunction 
than of the noun constituent. Moreover, the predicted data, presented in 
parentheses, show exactly the same effects.9 
SUBSEQUENT TESTS OF THE MODEL: STUDIES 2 AND 3 
In study 1, subjects rated the typicality of instances with respect to nouns 
and adjective-noun conjunctions. It is of interest, however, to also deter- 
mine the typicality of the instances vis-a-vis adjective constituents (e.g., red 
and round), and we did this in studies 2 and 3. Obtaining adjective ratings 
(along with noun and conjunction ratings) allowed us to evaluate two im- 
portant assumptions that were left implicit in the previous study. One is that 
adjectives, such as red and round, are represented by only a single attribute; 
if this is the case, we should be able to fit the model to the adjective ratings 
by assuming that red, say, contains only the attribute of color with all votes 
being on the value red. The second assumption of interest is that subjects 
base their typicality ratings for a conjunction (e.g., the typicality of apple in 
redfruit) on all attributes of the noun concept (e.g., color, shape, and tex- 
ture), not just on the attribute singled out by the adjective (color). To check 
this, for each set of instances, we correlated the ratings in the conjunction 
separately with those in the noun and with those in the adjective, to deter- 
mine whether each constituent was contributing to the conjunction’s ratings. 
The only differences between studies 2 and 3 is that in the latter study 
some noninstances of vegefuble cfmit) were included among the items paired 
with the vegetable (@it) concepts. For example, subjects had to rate the 
typicality of apple in vegefabfe, red, and red vegetable. The purpose of this 
change was to make the variability of the items paired with the noun concept 
more comparable with the variability of the items paired with the adjective 
concept; we need such comparability to compare the correlation between 
noun and conjunction ratings with that between adjective and conjunction 
ratings. Also, because the fruit instances in study 1 hardly varied with re- 
spect to white and long, in studies 2 and 3 we used the same instances, but 
only the conjunctions red fruit, round fruit, red vegetable, and round vege- 
tab/e. Because studies 2 and 3 are similar and produced comparable results, 
we treat them together in what follows. 
* The predicted ratings in Table 3 have been resealed to have the same mean and standard 
deviation as the obtained ratings in Table 3. This resealing preserves the correlations reported 
in Table 2 because in fitting our model we maximized the average correlations between pre- 
dicted and obtained ratings rather than minimized predicted-observed deviations. 
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Method 
Sludy 2. The subjects were 30 students drawn from the same population 
as in the previous study. All subjects rated the typicality of instances in three 
types of concepts: noun concepts, including fruit and vegetable, adjective 
concepts, including red and round, and conjunctions, including red fruit, 
roundfruit, red vegetable, and round vegetable. The 15 instances used with 
the fruit concepts were the same as those used in study 1, and so ‘were the 15 
instances used with vegetable concepts. In addition, both kinds of instances 
were used with red and round. Subjects thus made 10 sets of ratings. The 
order of the instances within each of these sets was randomized anew for 
each subject. 
Again subjects worked with booklets, where the first pages gave instruc- 
tions and subsequent pages contained the names of concepts followed by 
lists of 15 relevant instances. Concepts were blocked, so that all concepts of 
one type-noun, adjective, or conjunction-appeared on consecutive pages. 
All possible orders of the concept types were used. Other procedural details 
-rating scale, general content of instructions-were the same as in the pre- 
vious study. 
Study 3. The subjects were 30 students drawn from the usual population. 
The only change from the preceding study was in the nature of the fruit and 
vegetable “instances.” The set of fruit “instances” now included our usual 
15 fruits, plus 8 vegetables. Similarly, the set of vegetable “instances” in- 
cluded our usual 15 vegetables, plus 8 fruits. 
Results: Studies 2 and 3 
Evaluation of the Model. For each of the 10 concepts, we determined the 
average typicality ratings for the 15 critical instances. Then, for each con- 
cept, we correlated the obtained ratings with those predicted by the model. 
Applying our model to the data for adjective-noun conjunctions and their 
noun constituents involved nothing new. To apply the model to the data for 
adjective concepts, we assumed that the representation for an adjective con- 
sists of a single attribute, with all its votes on the value named by the adjec- 
tive. Consider red: The only attribute is color, and all 30 votes are on the 
value red (30 because that is the maximum number of votes that any value 
had in our noun representations). 
The results of these fits are in Table 4. In study 2, there is a relatively 
poor fit for the simple concept vegetable (just as we found in study l), but 
now all other correlations between observed and predicted typicalities are 
very high. The average correlation for the adjective-noun conjunctions is a 
resounding .94. The results for study 3 lend further credence to the model, 
as the average correlation for the adjective-noun conjunctions is .81. Also, 
the correlations for the simple concepts, vegetable and fruit, have increased, 
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TABLE 4 
Correlations between Obtained ond Predicted ~ypicollties 
(Studles 2 ond 3) 
















Fruit .70 .07 
Red .90 .97 
Round .96 .92 
Red Fruit .97 .91 
Round Fruit .95 .00 
presumably because of the increase in variability that resulted from includ- 
ing noninstances as well as instances of the concept. 
In Study 2 the three contrast-rule parameters were as follows: for fruif 
concepts, a = .80, b = .50, c= .20; for vegetable concepts, a = .92, b = .50, 
c = .20. In Study 3, for fruit concepts, a = 2.01, b = .50, c = .20; for vegetable 
concepts, a = 1.44, b = .56, c = .20. The values are similar in the two studies 
and close to those obtained in the previous study. The remaining parameter 
is the booster, d. In study 2, d was 8.06 for fruit concepts and 8.46 for vege- 
table concepts; in study 3, d was 4.24 for fruit concepts and 2.70 for vegeta- 
ble concepts. Again, these values are comparable with those obtained in 
study 1. 
Correlations between Conjunctions and Constituents. The above find- 
ings support our claim that the problematical results of study 1 were due to 
a lack of variation in the instances, and that the adjectives red and round 
can be represented by a single attribute. What remains to be checked is our 
assumption that subjects base their typicality ratings for a conjunction on 
all attributes of a noun concept. We checked this for each conjunction by 
determining the correlation (across instances) between ratings in a conjunc- 
tion and ratings in a particular constituent (with any contribution of the 
other constituent partialed out). These partial correlations are presented in 
Table 5. In study 2, ratings in a conjunction are more correlated with the ad- 
jective than the noun constituent, but the correlations with the noun are 
substantial and in two cases significant. In study 3, where the variability of 
instances in the noun concepts is comparable with that in the adjective con- 
cepts, all correlations are significant, and ratings in conjunctions are almost 
as correlated with the noun as the adjective constituents. Clearly, then, sub- 
jects ratings for conjunctions consider more than just the attribute singled 
out by the adjective. 
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TABLE 5 
Partial Correlations between Typicality Ratings in 
Con/unctions and Typicality Ratings in the Constituents 
(Studies 2 and 3) 

















Note. For pC.05, r=.50: far p<.Ol, r=.62 
EXTENSION OF THE MODEL TO ADVERBS 
In this section we extend the model to conjunctions that include the adverbs 
very, slightly, and non. Again the fundamental idea is that of modification. 
Now, however, the modifiers of interest are adverbs, and the frame that is 
altered is itself the outcome of a modification process (namely, the com- 
posite prototype that results when an adjective modifies a noun). 
Single Adverbs 
“Hedges” are a large class of adverbial modifiers whose major function 
seems to be that of qualifying predicates and which have previously figured 
in analyses of concept membership (e.g., Lakoff, 1973; Smith et al., 1974). 
As Lakoff (1973) notes, one subset of hedges includes terms like very, slightly, 
and non, where these terms seem to intensify aspects of the concepts or pro- 
totypes on which they operate (see also Clark & Clark, 1979; Cliff, 1959; 
Zadeh, 1971). While the principles by which such “intensifiers” operate are 
simpler than those characterizing most hedges (such as technically speaking 
or loosely speaking), intensifiers provide a useful starting point for extend- 
ing a model of composite prototypes to include adverbs. 
To illustrate how very, slightly, and non work, in very red fruit, very 
appears to augment the redness in red fruit; while in slightly red fruit or 
nonred fruit, the adverbs diminish the redness in red fruit. To capture these 
intuitions, we assume that: 
1. very augments the modified value in a conjunction (e.g., the red in red 
fruit) by multiplying the votes on that value by some scalar greater than 1; 
2. slightly diminishes the modified value in a conjunction by multiplying 
3. 
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the votes on that value by some scalar between 0 and 1, thereby ensuring 
that there is a decrease in votes on the value but still some votes left; and 
non diminishes the modified value in a conjunction by multiplying the 
votes on that value by a scalar less than or equal to 0, thereby ensuring 
that there are no (positive) votes left on the value. 
Possible scalars for the three adverbs are:. 
very: k,, where k,> 1 
slightly: 1 - kS, where o < k,< 1 
not (non): 1 -k,, where k, z 1 
Our reasons for using the format 1 -k, and 1 -k, will become apparent 
when we describe more complicated adverb combinations. 
To illustrate the above scheme, suppose that the number of red votes in 
red fruit is 10. When very is applied to red fruit, the number of red votes is 
increased by 10 k, - 10. When slightly is applied to red fruit, the number of 
red votes is decreased by 10 k, (since k, must be less than 1, the resulting 
number of red votes will always be greater than 0). When non is applied to 
redfruit the resulting number of red votes is decreased by lOk, (since k,, can 
never be less than 1, there can never be any red votes left). Thus very red 
fruit has more red than redfruit; slight& redfruit has less red than redfruit 
but more than zero red; and nonredfruit has no red at all. All of this is com- 
patible with our intuitions. 
A further comment is in order about our treatment of non. It might seem 
plausible that k, should always be 1, thereby ensuring that I- k, is always 0. 
As we will see, though, our results indicate that k,, exceeds 1, which means 
that 1 -k,, has a negative value. This in turn results in there being negative 
votes. Negative votes are to be treated as follows in computing similarity. 
Given a concept with negative votes on valuej of attribute i, and an instance 
with some votes on value j ’ of attribute i, then the votes on j ’ can be con- 
verted to negative votes on j as long as j ’ #j. We can illustrate with the con- 
cept nonred fruit; blueberry’s blue votes can be converted to negative red 
votes, thereby increasing its common color features with the concept; and 
the more salient the color of a particular nonred fruit, the more typical it 
will be of the concept nonred fruit. 
Dual Adverbs 
We can extend pur model one step further by considering conjunctions that 
mvolve two adverbs such as very nonredfruit and slightly nonround vegeta- 
ble. Combining adverbs comes down to combining scalars for single ad- 
verbs. One proposal for doing this is as follows: 
slightly not: 1 - [ (1 - kS)/cn] 
very not: 1 - (kv k,) 
very slight&: I- (k, ks) 
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In slightly not, not applies first to yield 1 -km, and then slightly operates 
directly on the value of k,, resulting in 1 - [(l - kS) k,,]. Hence the first- 
mentioned adverb has smaller scope than the second. Similarly, in very not, 
not applies first yielding 1 -km, and the very augments the value of k,, 
resulting in I- (k, k,). In very slightly, slightly applies first yielding I- k,, 
and then very augments the value of kS, resulting in 1 - (k, k,). To illustrate, 
slightly nonred fruit has more red than nonred fruit because we have dimin- 
ished the negation; in contrast, very nonredfruit has even less red than non- 
red fruit as we have augmented the negation, and very slightly red fruit has 
less red than slightly red fruit because we have augmented slightly. All of 
this seems in line with our intuitions. 
There are other schemes for combining scalars that are consistent with 
out assumptions about very, slightly, and non. One obvious possibility is to 
simply multiply scalars; for example, the scalar for slightly non would be 
(1 -k,) (1 -k,,). It turns out, though, that this proposal does not do as well 
at predicting typicality ratings as the scheme we have proposed. Thus, part 
of the rationale for our proposal is post hoc. Still, our scheme captures basic 
intuitions about the interpretations of adverbs in conjunctions and offers 
some interesting claims about combining adverbs (e.g., the first-mentioned 
adverb has smaller scope than the second-mentioned one), in addition to 
doing as reasonable job of predicting typicality ratings in complex concepts 
as other schemes we have tried. (For some related proposals from a fuzzy-set 
theory perspective, see Hersh & Carmazza, 1976; Lakoff, 1973; and Zadeh, 
1971; 1972). 
To predict the typicality of an instance in a complex conjunction such as 
nonred fruit, we used a simple extension of Equation (4): 
Sim (P,I) = Fe,+ [a tlIitl(&t~(P), no(I)) 
-t&4,?@(*) - q(I)) -c(nij(I) AAini’j(P))] (5) 
Now we multiply the number of votes on the modified value, nd(P), by the 
scalar associated with the adverb, Ai, where Al = k, if the adverb is very, 
Ar= 1 -k, if the adverb is slightly, and so on. (Strictly speaking, Equation 
(5) is correct only when Ai rid(P)) is nonnegative). Equation (5) involves seven 
parameters: four are the same as in Equation (4), namely, u, b. c, and e; the 
three new parameters are embedded in the Ai term and are the scalars k,, kS, 
and k,.‘O 
I’ Lakoff (1973) has argued that characterizing very and slight/y solely by numerical values 
runs into trouble when the adjective to be modified is similar. Thus, in contrasting “Richard 
Nixon and Warren Harding are similar” and “Richard Nixon and Warren Harding are very 
similar,” very seems to do more than just raise the degree of similarity. In particular, very 
seems to increase the number of attributes that are taken into consideration. However, our 
numerical proposals for very and s/ight/y seem to work well with most other adjectives. 
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A TEST OF THE EXTENDED MODEL: STUDY 4 
In study 4, we obtained typicality ratings for conjunctions involving the ad- 
verbs of interest, and then compared these ratings with those predicted by 
Equation (5). Study 4 was performed along with study 1 and it used the same 
fruit and vegetable instances. As a consequence, the ratings for concepts 
involving white fruit and long fruit again showed hardly any variability, 
which once more resulted in artifactually low correlations between observed 
and predicted typicalities. In view of this, we will focus on the ratings for 
concepts that involved red or round. 
Method 
The subjects were drawn from the same population as in previous studies, 
and were divided into three groups of 30 each. Each group rated the typical- 
ity of instances in 16 different complex conjunctions. For group 1, the 16 
conjunctions were generated by taking the basic 8 conjunctions from study 
1 (red fruit, white fruit. . . , long vegetable), and then modifying each one 
by very or non; for group 2, the 16 conjunctions were formed by modifying 
the basic 8 conjunctions by slightly or slightly non; and for group 3, the 
basic 8 conjunctions were modified by very slightly or very non. The 15 in- 
stances used with fruit concepts were the same as those in study 1, and sim- 
ilarly for the 15 instances used with vegetable concepts. Again subjects 
worked with booklets, where the first pages gave instructions and subse- 
quent pages contained the names of concepts followed by a list of the 15 
relevant instances. Other procedural details-rating scale, general content 
of instructions-were the same as in previous studies. 
Results 
A Preliminary Look at the Data. For each concept, we determined the 
average typicality rating for the 15 relevant instances. Before assessing how 
well these ratings agree with those predicted by the model, it is instructive to 
display a sample of the obtained ratings. In Table 6, the first column lists 
the 15 fruit instances ordered by their number of red votes, while the sec- 
ond, third, and fourth columns give the obtained typicality ratings of each 
instance in three conjunctions: red fruit (these data are from study l), non- 
redfruit (data from study 4), and very redfruit (study 4). The ratings for in- 
stances in red fruit increase roughly monotonically with the number of red 
votes in the instance (watermelon is a clear outlier, presumably because sub- 
jects rated inside rather than outside color). More importantly for present 
purposes, the ordering of the instances in nonred fruit is essentially the 
reverse of that in red fruit. This reversal is in line with our assumption that 
not multiplies the votes on red by a scalar less than zero, for then instances 
that were typical of red fruit (because they “had a lot of red”) are likely to 
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TABLE 6 
Obtained Typicality Ratings far 3 Sample Conjunctions 
(Studies 1 and 4) 
Instances Red Fruit NonRed Fruit Very Red Fruit 















Strawberry a.57 .34 
Apple 9.37 1.03 
Pomegranate 6.07 3.34 
Grape 3.60 5.24 
Peach 3.33 5.60 
‘Pear 1.37 8.03 
Fig 1.07 7.07 
Raisin .77 7.14 
Coconut .24 0.64 
Avocado .44 0.70 
Watermelon 5.44 2.04 
Pickle .27 7.77 
lemon .30 9.44 
Blueberry .47 9.00 
0 All instances from Pear through Blueberry had zero red votes. 
become atypical of nonred fruit (because they have too much red), and vice 
versa. Turning to very red fruit, the ratings are again roughly monotonic 
with the number of red votes in the instance. This is compatible with our 
assumption’ that very multiplies the votes on red by a positive scalar, for 
then instances with more votes on the adjective will be more typical of very 
red fruit. 
Evaluation of the Model. To assess the adequacy of our model quantita- 
tively, again we correlated the obtained ratings with those predicted by the 
model. (In fitting the model we included the data from study 1, as studies 1 
and 4 essentially constitute a single experiment.) A summary of the correla- 
tions is presented in Table 7. The results are broken down by: (1) vegetable 
or fruit; (2) the form of the concept-adjective-noun conjunctions (these 
data are from study l), or adverb-adjective-noun conjunctions, or adverb- 
adverb-adjective-noun conjunctions; and (3) the specific adverbs involved 
-very, slightly, and so on. 
For vegetable concepts, the model captures a good portion of the data, as 
almost all the correlations are above .60 and the overall average correlation 
is .70. However, the goodness of fit depends on the complexity of the con- 
cept: The correlation drops from .90 to .73 when an adverb is added to an 
adjective-noun conjunction, and drops further to .59 when a second adverb 
is added. Another thing to note is how correlations vary with the specific 
adverbs. For conjunctions with single adverbs, the model does best with 
TABLE 7 
Correlations between Obtained and Predicted Typicality Ratings, 
Separately for Different Kinds of Vegetable and Fruif Concepts 
(Studies 1 and 4) 
VEGETABLE CONCEPTS 
Red 
Vegetable .90 (.B7) 
Round 
Red 
Very Vegetable .86 (.B7) 
Round 
Red 
Slightly Vegetoble .63 (.W 
Round 
Red 
Non Vegetable .70 (.‘W 
Round 
Red 
Average for Adverb Vegetable .73 (.72) 
Round 
Red 
Very Slightly Vegetable .44 (.47) 
Round 
Red 
Slightly Non Vegetable .64 (.4B) 
Round 
Red 
Very Non Vegetable .70 MJ) 
Round 
Red 




Fruit .92 (.54) 
Round 
Red 
Very Fruit .90 (.57) 
Round 
Red 
Slightly Fruit .74 (.52) 
Round 
Red 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
FRUIT CONCEPTS 
Red 
Average for Adverb Fruit .7B (49) 
Round 
Red 
Very Slightly Fruit .2B (.2g) 
Round 
Red 
Slightly Non Fruit .7Q (.41) 
Round 
Red 
Very Non Fruit .64 (.34) 
Round 
Red 
Average far Adverb Adverb Fruit .S4 (.32) 
Round 
a The entries in parentheses give the correlation when all concepts are included, i.e., 
those involving white and long as well as those involving red and round. While the correlo- 
tions ore much reduced, particularly for fruit, even these tainted data show the usual ef- 
fects of complexity and specific adverbs. 
concepts that involve very (r= .86) and worst with those that involve slightly 
(r= .63); for concepts with dual adverbs, the model does best with concepts 
that involve very ROE (r = -70) and worst with those that involve very slightly 
(r= 44). 
A comment is in order about the decrease in correlation with the increase 
in concept complexity. There are two factors that contribute to this “com- 
plexity” effect. First, the effect is partly a consequence of the effects of 
specific adverbs. The model does poorest with concepts involving slightly, 
and the average correlation for single-adverb concepts includes one case 
with slightly while the average for dual-adverb concepts includes two cases 
with slightly. Inspection of Table 7 indicates that if we ignore concepts in- 
volving slightly, the complexity effect is substantially reduced. The second 
factor contributing to the complexity effect is reliability-subjects were less 
reliable in their ratings for dual-adverb concepts than for single-adverb or 
adjective-noun conjunctions. Split-half reliabilities were .93 and .95 for ad- 
jective-noun and single-adverb conjunctions, respectively, versus .88 for 
dual-adverb concepts. Apparently, subjects had some difficulty composing 
concepts that involved more than one adverb-possibly because of ambig- 
uities in the scope of the adverbs-and when their performance became less 
systematic the model of course faltered. 
Turning now to the data for fruit concepts in study 4, the results mirror 
the preceding ones in most important respects (see Table 7). The model cap- 
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tures a reasonable amount of the data, with the overall average correlation 
again being .70. Once more correlations decrease as the concepts become in- 
creasingly complex, dropping from .92 to .78 when a single adverb is added 
to an adjective-noun conjunction, and dropping further to 54 when a sec- 
ond adverb is added. Again this complexity effect can be attributed to the 
effects of slightly (see Table 7) and to a breakdown in reliability; with regard 
to the latter, the split-half reliabilities were .96 and .94 for adjective-noun 
and single-adverb conjunctions, respectively, versus .80 for dual-adverb 
conjunctions. With regard to the effects of specific adverbs, once more the 
model does best with very for single-adverb concepts, and worst with very 
slightly for dual-adverb concepts. 
In sum, the selective modification model does an excellent job of account- 
ing for ratings in adjective-noun conjunctions (the average correlation for 
the data in Table 7 is .91), a good job of accounting for ratings in adverb- 
adjective-noun conjunctions (the average correlation is .76), and at best a 
moderate job of accounting for ratings in dual-adverb concepts (the average 
correlation is about 56). There is, however, a blatant trouble spot for the 
model, namely concepts involving slightfy, as correlations between pre- 
dicted and observed ratings are routinely lower for such concepts than for 
other conjunctions. We return to the slightly problem soon, after we have 
taken a look at the parameters obtained in fitting the model. 
Purumeter Estimates. The top half of Table 8 gives the parameters ob- 
tained when the model is fit to vegetobfe concepts, and the bottom half gives 
the parameters for fruit concepts. The different rows give the parameters 
for the different studies (to facilitate comparisons, we have repeated the 
parameters obtained in studies l-3). The three parameters of the contrast 
model are very stable. In virtually every case, the weight given to common 
TABLE B 






























kn k, kv 
- - - 
- - - 
- - - 
1.66 .74 1.04 
4.21 - - - 
8.06 - - - 
4.24 - - - 
12.92 1.59 -56 3.63 
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features, a, exceeds that given to features distinct to the concept, b, which in 
turn exceeds that given to features distinct to the instance, c. The booster 
parameter is somewhat more variable, d being quite low for vegefable con- 
cepts in study 3 and extremely large for vegetable concepts study 4. The re- 
maining three parameters pertain to the adverbs, and generally these values 
are stable and reasonable. Thus k,, averages about 1.60. This results in a 
scalar for not of roughly - .60, which eliminates all positive votes on the 
modified value of a conjunction. Similarly, k, averages about .65. This 
results in a scalar of about .35, which substantially reduces the votes on the 
modified value of a conjunction but does leave some votes there. The re- 
maining parameter, k,, is a bit more variable being 1.04 for vegetables and 
3.63 for fruits. This reflects the fact that there was little difference between, 
say, concepts involving very red and those involving red or vegetable, but a 
noticeable difference between the two kinds of concepts for fruit. 
Note that the parameters common to all four studies-a, b, c, and d- 
provide support for two fundamental assumptions of the model. The fact 
that the similarity parameters b and c were always greater than zero attests 
to the contrast rule’s assumption that similarity depends on distinctive fea- 
tures, not just common ones. And the fact that the booster parameter d was 
always substantial supports the claim that an adjective modifier boosts the 
diagnosticity of the associated attribute in the noun.” 
In addition to the above, there are many “hidden” parameters in our 
model-namely, the attributes, values, and votes of the instances and con- 
cepts that were estimated by empirical means. For these hidden parameters, 
the critical question is whether their values depend on the methods used to 
obtain them. In particular, are our attribute-value representations for fruit 
and vegetable-which enter into every single prediction of the model-biased 
by the fact that they were determined by averaging over instances? To 
answer this, we had a new group of 30 subjects list properties for fruit and 
vegetable and used these listings to determine directly the attribute-value 
structures for the two simple concepts. The new fruit and vegetable proto- 
types contained fewer attributes than the old ones (an average of 13 attributes 
rather than 29, but the vast majority of attributes in the new prototypes 
were among those attributes of the old prototypes that had the largest num- 
bers of votes. Most importantly, when the new representations for fruit and 
vegetable were used to recompute all predictions for studies 1-4, there was 
hardly any decrease in how well the model fit the data (in study 4, for exam- 
ple, the average overall correlation changed from .70 to .68). 
” Note that in Table 8 the parameters b and c virtually always equaled 50 and .20, respec- 
tively. These constancies reflect the fact that, in fitting the model, we relied on the outcomes of 
preliminary fits and set the initial values of u, b, c, and d to I.00, 50, .20, and 6.0, respectively. 
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Further Annlysis of Slightly. Because the model did relatively poorly 
with concepts involving slight/y, it is useful to take a closer look at the data 
obtained with such concepts. An analysis of the ratings for slightly concepts 
is presented in Figure 6. We have plotted the observed typicality of an in- 
stance in a conjunction involving slightly as a function of the instance’s 
votes on the modified value. Thus the data entering into the curve labeled 
“slightly” include the typicality of the fruit instances in slightly redfruit as 
a function of how many red votes they have, the typicality of the fruit in- 
stances in slightly round fruit as a function of how many round votes they 
have, and similarly for the typicality of the vegetable instances in slightly 
red vegetable and slightly round vegetable. Each curve therefore averages 
over results for conjunctions involving red fruit, round fruit, red vegetable, 
and round vegetable (with different instances contributing the different 
points). There are separate curves for the three kinds of conjunctions in- 
volving slightly, and a fourth curve for adjective-noun conjunctions that 
serves as a frame of reference. 
Compared with the curve for adjective-noun, all functions involving 
slightly are relatively flat. This uniformity sheds some light on the problems 
we have had with slight/y-though the model is compatible with more uni- 
form ratings for slightly than for the other adverbs, the fact that the ob- 
tained ratings vary so little makes it difficult for correlations with predicted 
scores to emerge. This statistical problem notwithstanding, the functions 
for slightly and slightly non manifest several trends that are congruent with 
the modification model. 
The function for slightly initially rises and then levels off. The model is 
compatible with the rising trend (e.g., because slightly red fruit has a few 
red votes, it is more similar to peach than to blueberry). The model further 
suggests that the slightly function should decline at instances that contain 
many votes on the,adjective (e.g., because slightly red fruit has only a few 
red votes, it is quite dissimilar to strawberry), thereby resulting in an overall 
nonmonotonic curve. (Lakoff’s, 1973, analysis of sort of provides a similar 
argument.) There is some evidence for this nonmonotonicity in the slightly 
function in Figure 6. There might have been more evidence for this non- 
monotonicity were it not for the case that the word “slightly” has a prag- 
matic ambiguity common to all quantitative words (Gazdar, 1979; Horn, 
1972). Quantitative terms can be used to mean either Nor at least N. Thus, 
slightly red can mean either (I - k,)red or at least (I - k,)red, and under the 
latter interpretationeven strawberry is slightly red. 
The function/for slight? non is remarkably similar to that for slightly. 
ay seem surprising, but it is compatible with the model 
relation obtained among the parameters for slightly 
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for very slighfly and here there is a serious discrepancy from the model. 
While very slightly resembles siighfly, the model would have it behave more 
like non, being relatively high for instances that lack votes on the adjective 
and relatively low for instances that have many votes on the adjective. 
The preceding qualitative analyses clarify the trouble spots that emerged 
in our quantatitive modeling. For all concepts involving slightly, typicality 
ratings were uniformly low; though compatible with our model, this uni- 
formity restricts the correlations with predicted’ scores. Furthermore, be- 
cause of the ambiguity of “slightly,” the predicted nonmonotonicity of the 
function for slightly might have been obscured. And for concepts involving 
very slightly, the obtained data are at odds with some aspects of the model, 
which explains why these concepts yielded the lowest correlations between 
observed and predicted scores. 
SUMMARY AND OTHER ISSUES 
Summary 
We began with three general aspects of a prototype-attribute-value struc- 
ture, salience, and diagnosticity-and three specific findings about typicality 
effects in conjunctions-the conjunction effect, a greater conjunction effect 
for incompatible than compatible conjunctions, and the reverse conjunction 
effect. These aspects and findings guided our development of the selective 
modification model. One component of the model is a prototype represen- 
tation for simple noun concepts, which specifies the relevant attributes and 
values for a concept along with numerical indicators of the diagnosticities 
of the attributes and the salience or votes for each value. The second com- 
ponent of our model specifies probdures for modifying prototypes. The 
procedure for adjectival modification consists of: (1) selecting the relevant 
attribute(s) in the noun prototype, (2) shifting all votes on that attribute(s) 
into the value(s) denoted by the adjective, and (3) boosting the diagnosticity 
of the attribute(s). The third component of the model is Tversky’s (1977) 
contrast rule for determining typicality. The resulting package not only 
readily accounts for the three specific effects that started us off, but also 
allows us to elaborate each simple effect into a continuum; for example, the 
magnitude of the conjunction effect for an instance of red fruit depends on 
the number of red votes in the instance. 
Study 1 provided an initial test of the model. First we used property list- 
ings to construct attribute-value representations for the noun concepts fruit 
and vegetable and for various instances of these concepts. Then we applied 
the model to produce representations for conjunctions, and to predict typi- 
calities for the instances in the simple concepts and conjunctions. These 
predicted ratings were highly correlated with obtained ratings for most of 
the adjective-noun conjunctions that we tested. 
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There were, however, three concepts where the model’s predictions failed 
to correlate highly with the obtained ratings. These concepts included long 
fruit, white fruit, and vegetable. We attributed the apparent failures of the 
model to a lack of variability in length, whiteness, and vegetableness among 
the instances paired with the relevant concepts (e.g., the instances paired 
with long fruit were all about the same size). To circumvent these variability 
problems, in studies 2 and 3 we used the same instances as in study 1 but em- 
ployed only those conjunctions that involved red or round. Also, in study 3 
we increased the variability of the items paired with fruit and vegetable con- 
cepts by including some noninstances of these concepts. In study 2, pre- 
dicted scores were highly correlated with obtained scores for all concepts 
save vegetable, while in study 3 the model’s predictions worked for all con- 
cepts. Moreover, the results of studies 2 and 3 provided support for two ad- 
ditional assumptions of the model; namely, that adjectives such as red and 
round contain only a single attribute, and that subjects base their typicality 
ratings for a conjunction on all attributes of the noun concept. 
Next we extended the model to conjunctions that involve the adverbs 
very, slightly, or non, which seem to function as intensifiers. We added to 
the modification component of our model procedures for adverbial modifi- 
cation. The basic procedure consists of multiplication-by-a-scalar of the 
votes on a modified value. There are different scalars for the different ad- 
verbs, the scalar for very increases the votes on the values, that for slightly 
decreases the votes on the value but does not eliminate all votes on the value, 
and that for non eliminates all votes on the value. We extended the modifica- 
tion component further by proposing a means of combining scalars, thereby 
enabling the model to deal with concepts that involved dual adverbs. 
Study 4 provided a test of the extended model. We generally found rea- 
sonable correlations between obtained typicality ratings for concepts involv- 
ing single or dual adverbs and ratings predicted by the extended model. The 
exceptions were concepts involving slightly. Further analyses indicated that 
the obtained typicality ratings for siightfy concepts were uniformly low, 
which restricted correlations with predicted scores, and that some aspects of 
the ratings for very slightly were not captured by the model. 
Taken together these four studies provide evidence for many of the 
assumptions that make up the model. Moreover, the model is among the 
only theories of prototype combination to offer quantitative predictions 
about typicality, these predictions being based on data obtained from a 
paradigm (property listing) that is entirely different from rating typicalities. 
Of course, our case for the model is limited by our having dealt only with 
typicality ratings. But, as we noted at the outset, research with simple con- 
cepts has demonstrated that such ratings can be used to predict typicality ef- 
fects on many kinds of performance, and there is good reason to expect the 
situation to turn out similarly with composite concepts. 
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Some Qualitative Implications 
In addition to providing quantitative predictions about typicality, the selec- 
tive modification model also offers qualitative insights about some important 
phenomena, including the generation of goal-derived concepts and apparent 
changes of concept structure with changing context. 
Following Barsalou (1985), some concepts are created “on the fly’ dur- 
ing one’s efforts to achieve a goal. Examples of such “goal-derived” con- 
cepts include foods not to eat on a diet and possessions to save in the event 
of fire. Thus far researchers have treated goal-derived concepts as discon- 
nected from natural concepts, such as fruit and vegetable. From the per- 
spective of the selective modification model, however, many goal-derived 
concepts may be modified concepts like the ones discussed in this paper. 
Foods not to be eaten on a diet, for instance, may be roughly synonymous 
with high-calorie foods, a modification of food where all votes on the 
calories attribute have been shifted to the high end. Similarly, p&sessions to 
save in the event of a fire may be roughly synonymous with valuableposses- 
sions, a modification of possession where all votes on the worth attribute 
have been shifted to the high end. 
Along with suggesting a mechanism for how goal-derived concepts are 
constructed, our approach provides a new account of some of Barsalou’s 
(1985) major results. In particular, consider the finding that the typicality of 
an instance in a goal-derived concept is a function not of its similarity to 
other instances (or to a prototype summarizing those instances), but rather 
of its value on the dimension most relevant to the concept. For foods not to 
eat on a diet, for example, chocolate is more typical than bread and it also 
has a higher value on the relevant dimension of calories,. All of this is intelli- 
gible in terms of the selective modification model. In composing high-calorie 
foods, if the diagnosticity of the calories attribute is boosted sufficiently 
high, this attribute will dominate typicality decisions and the effect of the in- 
stance’s overall similarity to its prototype will be minimized. What looks 
like a qualitative switch in the process underlying typicality judgments may 
thus turn out to be just a quantitative change in one parameter of the process. 
A similar story can be told about Roth and Shoben’s (1983) proposal that 
context can change the basic structure of a concept. In one relevant experi- 
ment, subjects were timed as they read pairs of sentences in succession, such 
as (la) and (2), or (lb) and (2): 
(la) Stacy milked the animal on the farm. 
(lb) Fran wanted to ride the animal. 
(2) She was very fond of the cow. 
To understand (2), the reader must determine that “cow” refers to the same 
entity as “animal” does in the preceding sentence. Roth and Shoben found 
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that this determination of coreference was easier when (2) was preceded by 
(la) than (lb), and concluded that the context in (1) changed the meaning of 
the concept animal. The selective modification model, however, offers an 
alternative explanation. The different contexts in (la) and (lb) lead the 
reader to construct different modified concepts, roughly, milkable farm 
animal and ridable animal, and it is these composites that the reader must 
relate to cow when reading the second sentence. (Alternatively, the modi- 
fied concepts may strongly suggest particular instances-milkable farm 
animal suggests cow-which are then related to cow when reading the sec- 
ond sentence.) More generally, the basic.claim of the selective modification 
model is that the meaning of a simple concept is relatively fixed and ap- 
parent meaning changes are due to modification. 
Relations to Other Proposals 
It is worth commenting briefly on the relation of the qu&tative aspects of 
the selective modification model to some related proposals about prototype 
combination due to Thagard (1984) and Cohen and Murphy (1984). These 
researchers represent prototypes as “frames” (in the sense of Minsky, 1975). 
Our prototype representations can also be interpreted as frames. Our attri- 
butes are slots, our values are slot-fillers, and the distribution of votes over 
values is a distribution of defaults. Once this interpretation is made, it is 
easy to see that our model is compatible with the proposals of Thagard 
(1984) and Cohen and Murphy (1984). 
Thagard (1984) treats simple concepts as frames, and notes that a slot- 
filler can be either a default value or an actual value. He then goes on to 
argue that in an adjective-noun conjunction, often there is at least one slot 
that is common to the two constituents (say, color), and the slot-filler for 
the adjective will dominate because it is interpreted as an actual value while 
the corresponding filler for the noun is only a default. Thagard’s critical 
assumption, then, is that “actual values drive .out defaults.” All of this is 
completely in line with the modification component of our model. In the 
latter, it is the value named by the adjective (which corresponds to a slot- 
filler) that determines the final locus of the votes on the relevant attribute 
(slot) of the noun representation. In essence, we capture the same intuition 
as Thagard by letting the adjective direct the noun’s votes. 
Cohen and Murphy (1984) assume that: (1) Simple noun concepts are 
represented by frames like those discussed above; and (2) Slots are restricted 
to particular values-for example, at a minimum, the values that fill the 
shape slot for fruit cannot also fill its color slot. Adjective-noun conjunc- 
tion is treated as a further restriction on values. In red fruit, for example, 
the color slot of fruit is restricted to red, and in expert repair the agent slot 
of repair is restricted to experts (these notions are adapted from the KL-ONE 
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system of knowledge representation-see, e.g., Brachman & Schmolze, 
1985). Cohen and Murphy’s ideas have their obvious counterparts in the 
selective modification model: Attributes (slots) are restricted to the values 
(fillers) listed for them, and adjectival modification results in all votes for 
an attribute (slot) being restricted to one value (filler). 
The point of the above is not that there are no distinct aspects of the work 
of Thagard or of Cohen and Murphy-Thagard considers context effects in 
adjectival modification, while Cohen and Murphy consider far more com- 
plex cases of modification than we do. Rather, the point is that there are no 
basic incompatibilities between our work and that of others using frame 
representations to model conceptual combination (see Murphy, 1988, for an 
extended comparison of models). 
Limitations of the Selective Modification Model 
Having made the case for our model, it seems judicious to close with some 
discussion of its limitations. 
For one thing, there is a problem of “neutral” adjectives (as opposed to 
compatible and incompatible ones). Our modeling considered only those 
cases where the adjective encoded an attribute that presumably was part of 
the noun representation (red and round, say, encode the attributes color 
and shape, which are prestored in the prototype for fruit). What about 
cases like upside-down fruit, where the adjective encodes an attribute (orien- 
tation) that is unlikely to be part of the prototype for fruit? In Smith and 
Osherson (1984), we showed that such neutral conjunctions gave rise to the 
usual conjunction effects and their reverse. Our problem is how to model 
such effects. A possible solution is outlined in Cohen and Murphy (1984). 
In cases such as upside-down fruit, the relevant attribute must temporarily 
be added to the noun representation; then perhaps the value, votes, and 
boosted diagnosticity can be filled in (the value is that named by the adjec- 
tive, the votes may be the maximum possible, and the boosted diagnosticity 
may be a constant). Of course this suggestion raises further questions-for 
example, how one determines the relevant attribute given only the adjective 
-but the suggestion seems worth pursuing. 
A related difficulty is that the adjectives we have treated are all simple 
ones like red, which plausibly affect only a single attribute of a noun’s rep- 
resentation. But many adjectives have more complex consequences for the 
noun phrases in which they appear. For starters, there are adjectives like 
shriveled, which we used in an earlier example and which require the model 
to operate simultaneously on two or more attributes (e.g., texture and 
shape). Although we believe the model is adequate for most multiattribute 
adjectives of this sort, we lack empirical evidence to support this claim. A 
more serious challenge comes from adjectives that produce more sweeping 
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changes to the nouns they modify. Consider, for example, a combination 
such as fake apple. Although fake seems to leave some of the attributes of 
apple intact, it negates many others; thus, a fake apple might be of roughly 
the same color and shape as a real apple, but has a different texture, origin, 
and taste. R. Clark (1970) provides a useful catalog of these nonstandard 
adjectives (see also Kamp, 1975) that comprises the following types: negators 
(e.g., fake), enlargers (e.g., possible),fictionalizers, (e.g., mythical), defic- 
tionalizers (e.g., simulated), and neutralizers (e.g., alleged). Adjectives of 
each type can be distinguished by the inferences that they license; a fake 
apple, for instance, is necessarily a nonapple, whereas an alleged apple may 
be an apple. Presumably, the prototypes of these noun phrases differ in cor- 
responding ways, but the task of characterizing these prototypes goes 
beyond what we can accomplish by means of our selective modification 
model. 
Another limitation of our model is that it might be restricted to conjunc- 
tions of a certain syntactic form. Consider the contrast between (1) redfruit 
and (2) red and fruit. We have produced evidence that the adjective and 
noun play different roles (modifier and frame) in the first construction, but 
it is by no means obvious that this is true for the second construction (Oden, 
1984, makes a similar point). In red and fruit, perhaps red is treated as a 
concept like fruit, rather than as a procedure for operating on fruit, and 
conceptual combination involves determining the intersection of the two 
concepts. This is an idea that we rejected for adjective-noun constructions, 
but it might work for the explicit and construction. These reservations 
about the generality of our proposals are amplified when we consider con- 
structions even further removed, say explicit disjunction as in red or fruit. 
In short, complex concepts can be composed in different syntactic forms 
and it remains an open question whether different forms use different mod- 
ification procedures. 
Another limitation of our model is that it does not offer a convincing ac- 
count of a phenomenon involving adjective-noun conjunctions that has 
figured centrally in previous discussions of conceptual combination (Osher- 
son & Smith, 1982). Consider an object whose shape is midway between 
that of a block and that of a ball, and which is considered equally typical of 
the simple concepts block and ball. Intuitively, it seems that the object will 
be considered more typical of the conjunction round block than of the con- 
junction round ball because it is round for a block but not for a ball. This 
phenomenon rules out a large class of models of the fuzzy-set theory type. 
The most plausible way to account for this phenomenon in terms of the 
selective modification model is to assume that ball and block differ appre- 
ciably in their number of shape votes (to the extent these numbers are the 
same, the object in question should be equally typical of round block and 
round ball). But this assumption seems very dubious. 
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However, a slight revision of the model makes it compatible with the 
above phenomenon. When an adjective is applied to a noun, instead of all 
votes on the relevant attribute being shifted to the value denoted by the ad- 
jective, perhaps some votes are left in their original position. Thus, in form- 
ing round block, while most of the shape votes are shifted to round, some 
are left on square. Consequently, the object in question, which also has 
shape votes on both round and square, will find more matching shape votes 
in round block that in round ball (in the latter, all shape votes are round). 
While this revision of the model introduces another free parameter (the pro- 
portion of votes shifted), it leads to an interesting prediction. In an incom- 
patible conjunction, typicality should be less for objects that maximally ex- 
emplify the adjective than for those that moderately exemplify it. The most 
typical round block is not perfectly round, and the most typical square 
cantelope is probably a bit round. This prediction remains to be tested. 
Our last reservation about the model is that it deals with only the knowl- 
edge contained in prototypes, yet sometimes people bring to bear their gen- 
eral knowledge in making a decision about concept membership (see, e.g., 
Lakoff, 1987; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rips, 1988). To illustrate with an ex- 
ample from Murphy and Medin, if at a party you see a person jump into a 
pool fully clothed, probably you would categorize him or her as drunk. This 
categorization is almost certainly not based on similarity to a prototype, be- 
cause your prototype for drunk is unlikely to include any mention of jump- 
ing into pools clothed. Rather, your categorization is probably based on 
your general knowledge about parties, liquor, and erratic behavior. 
In addition to influencing categorization processes, general knowledge 
may also affect the processes involved in constructing a composite proto- 
type. Murphy (1988) points out that one may need general knowledge to 
determine which attributes of the noun are to be modified as well as to fill in 
the complex concept so that it is coherent (see also Hampton, 1987). Given 
the conjunction, apartment dog, for example, one needs general knowledge 
to: (1) know that apartment modifies the habitat attribute of dog, and (2) 
refine the composite by adding that an apartment dog is likely to be smaller, 
quieter, and better-behaved than dogs in general. 
The above arguments indicate that the selective modification model of- 
fers an incomplete picture of the composition and use of modified concepts. 
Several considerations, however, suggest that the model will form an impor- 
tant component of any more general theory of conceptual combination. For 
one thing, the model may be adequate to handle many adjective-noun com- 
binations, for the examples used to show the role of general knowledge 
typically involve noun-noun composites (such as apartment dog). Another 
matter is that even in cases where general knowledge is used, it may not cornI: 
into play until after the procedures specified in the selective modification 
model. That is;our model may describe a rapid composition process, which 
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is sometimes followed by a slower composition process that uses general 
knowledge. A third consideration is that, even if it turns out that the pro- 
cessing of general knowledge must be interleaved with the procedures of the 
selective modification model, the model still tells us the basic subtasks that 
modification must accomplish, such as finding the relevant attributes in the 
noun, boosting their diagnosticities and altering the saliences of their con- 
stituent values, and so on. 
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